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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A2-801 (1979), Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1988), Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1996), and Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 14.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although the brief of Stouffer Food and Liberty Mutual Insurance company enumerates two
issues for review by the Court, the Utah Labor Commission ("Commission") believes that the issues
are better addressed together.
1.
After The 1979 Amendments To Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68, Is The
Employer And/Or The Employer's Insurance Carrier liable For Continued
Death Benefits To The Dependents Of A Deceased Covered Employee After 312
Weeks Of Receiving Such Benefits, Or Is The Employers' Reinsurance Fund
Liable For Such Continued Benefits ?
Standard of Review: The Labor Commission agrees that this appeal concerns an issue of
statutory construction which should be reviewed under a "correction of error" standard. Brown &
Root v. Industrial Commission, 947 P. 2d 671 (Utah 1997).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Commission adopts the statement of the case, including the statement of facts, set forth
in Stouffer Food's Brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 was amended in 1979 by the 43rd legislature in Senate Bill 111
with the specific legislative intent to shift liability for ongoing death benefits for surviving
1

dependants, after 312 weeks, from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the employer and/or the
employer's insurance carrier. Floor Debate February 16, 1979, 43rd Legislature [ Commission's
Exhibit "1"]. The legislature in passing Senate Bill 111, the 1979 amendment to Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-68, specifically found that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was, at that time, in danger of
insolvency unless liability for ongoing death benefits after 312 weeks was shifted from the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the employer and/or the employer's insurance carrier. [ id.].
Contrary to Stouffer's interpretation, this Court in Hales found that after 1973, Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-70 became a vestigial appendage to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68, and that Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-70 had escaped legislative repeal only by an oversight. Hales v. Industrial Commission, 854
P. 2d 537, 542 fn. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 became irrelevant after 1973
and is of no help to Stouffer. Id.
ARGUMENT
THE 1979 AMENDMENT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-68 WAS
SPECIFICALLY CRAFTED TO SHIFT LIABILITY FOR DEATH
BENEFITS AFTER 312 WEEKS FROM THE EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND TO THE EMPLOYER AND/OR THE EMPLOYER'S
INSURANCE CARRIER.
Stouffer's arguments are largely dependant on an attempt by Stouffer to divine a legislative
intent consistent with Stouffer's position by marshaling an involute arrangement of various sections
from Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 and Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70. Such an exercise is unnecessary as
the relevant legislative intent is readily accessible.
The Utah Senate floor debate record from the 43rd legislature for February 16,1979, sets forth
the comments of Senators Cornaby and Bunnell concerning the purpose of Senate Bill 111, which
bill amended Utah Code §35-1-68 :
2

Cornaby:

Senate Bill 111 comes to us from the State Industrial Commission
and is entitled Workman's Compensation. The purpose of the bill is
to correct an inequity which has arisen in the so called "second injury
fund". Now this is the fund that pays benefits to spouses and
dependants of covered workers who were killed in employment. At
the present time the fund has become actuarially unsound and is
getting further into an unsound position. The purpose of the of this
bill is to correct that situation by transferring the, bv shifting the
burden from the "second injury fund". The Industrial Commission
has worked on this bill for the past year and have finally worked this
solution to the problem. The bill is essential from this standpoint that
if this not done we will find our "second injury fund" in a bankruptcy
situation. I think senator Bunnell has a comment.

Bunnell:

As I understand this bill first it takes the spouse, the beneficiary out
of the second injury fund and requires that the employer or the
insurance company who had the original insurance will have to
continue to pay those benefits
That's roughly the purpose of this,
and if we don't do that there isn't going to be any money in the
second injury fund to pay anyone so I would urge the support of this
bill.

Floor Debate February 16, 1979, 43rd Legislature [Commission's Exhibit "1" emphasis added].
From the plain, simple statements of the legislative proponents of SB 111, the 1979
amendment to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68, there is no question that the legislative intent and purpose
of the bill was to relieve the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("second injury fund") of any continued
liability for death benefits under the statute, while in turn shifting that liability to the employer or
the employer's insurance carrier. This in fact was the sole purpose of the 1979 amendment to Utah
Code §35-1-68 because the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("second injury fund") was actuarially
unsound and facing bankruptcy. Id_
With the straightforward legislative purpose of SB 111 set forth, the analysis of the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1979) provided by the Administiative Law Judge in the
3

Order dated December 18, 1997 (Stouffer's Exhibit "2"), and as adopted by the Appeals Board in
its order of March 27, 1998, (Stouffer's Exhibit "3"), offers the only logically consistent analysis of
the relevant code sections. Judge Elicerio correctly concludes that the 1979 amendment to Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-68 deletes or removes "Language, previously in the statute, specifically stating that
the special fund (or ERF) was to pay continuing benefits" [Order of Judge Elicerio, December 18,
1997, (Stouffer's Exhibit "2" p. 105), citing Laws of Utah, 1979, Ch. 138, p.778, subsection (2) (d)
interlined language, (Commission's Exhibit "2")]. Judge Elicerio also observes that the 1979
amendment to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 reorganizes " [t]he subsections, to place the new language
regarding payment of continuing benefits under the general language describing the liability of the
employer/carrier"

[Order of Judge Elicerio, December 18, 1997, (Stouffer's Exhibit "2" p. 105),

citing Laws of Utah, 1979, Ch. 138, p.778, subsection (2) (b) (ii) interlined language, [Commission's
Exhibit "2")]. The 1988 amended version of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 referenced by Stouffer,
contains nothing that would alter the 1979 amendment's transfer of liability for continued death
benefits from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the employer or the employer's insurance earner
that was effected by the 1979 amendment.
Stouffer tries to argue that the following language in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1) (1988)
indicates that the 1979 amendment did not shift liability for continuing death benefits from the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the employer or the employer's insurance carrier:
There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of making
payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35. This fluid shall succeed to
monies previously held in the "Special Fund", the "Combined Injury Fund", or the
"Second Injury Fund".
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Stouffer contends that since the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was statutorily created to
"make payments", those payments must necessarily be the continued payment of death benefits after
312 weeks for new cases arising after the 1979 amendment. [Stouffer's Brief p.12]. Stouffer's non
sequitur ignores the fact that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was created to succeed to the
"Special Fund", the "Combined Injury Fund", and the "Second Injury Fund", and therefore the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund succeeded to the liabilities incurred by those funds prior to the 1979
amendment. Certainly the Employers' Reinsurance Fund would have to make payments, namely
those ongoing payments for liabilities incurred prior to the 1979 amendment to Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-68.
Stouffer next asserts that the requirements contained in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2) (d)
(1988) demonstrate that the statute logically requires the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to continue
to fund continuing death benefits because, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2) (d) (1988) requires the
employer to pay to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund the difference between $30,000 and what the
employer actually paid to the decedent employee's dependants prior to the termination of
dependency. [Stouffer's Brief p. 14]. Stouffer maintains that the statute would not require the
employer to help finance the Employers' Reinsurance Fund if the Fund did not continue to incur new
liability for death benefits. Id.
Stouffer fails to mention the fact that the provisions in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2) (d)
(1988) were deleted in the 1990 amendment to the statute Seei Laws Of Utah, 1990, Ch. 110, pp
404-405 [Commission's Exhibit "3"]. The 1990 amendment is some four years prior to the 1994
amendment, which 1994 amendment Stouffer contends was the actual amendment relieving the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund of liability for continuing death benefits [Stouffer's Brief p. 16].
5

Under Stouffer's reasoning, in 1990 the legislature stripped the Employers' Reinsurance Fund of its
financing source for the payment of continuing death benefits some four years before the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund was relieved of liability for paying the same benefits. As indicated earlier, the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund did continue to have some responsibility for prior incurred liability,
which more logically accounts for the legislature delaying the removal of the funding provisions
contained in former Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2) (d) (1988) until 1990. Stouffer's reliance on
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2) (d) (1988) is without any compelling significance.
Stouffer, next urges that because the 1994 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68
specifically references the employer and the insurance carrier in Subsection (5) (a) (ii) that this is
the amendment that was intended to finally shift liability for death benefits from the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund to the employer or the employer's insurance carrier.

As stated by the

Administrative Law Judge, the specific reference to the employer and the employers' insurance
carrier contained in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (5)(a) (ii) (1994) merely clarified what had been a fact
since the 1979 amendment.
Stouffer's most puzzling argument is Stouffer's simultaneous reliance on Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-70 (1953) together with the case Hales v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 854 P. 2d 537 (Ut.
Ct. App. 1993). Stouffer contends that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) specifically places liability
for continuing death benefits on the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and limits the liability of the
employer and or the employer's insurance carrier. [Stouffer's Brief p. 12 -13, 16]. Apparently,
Stouffer overlooked foot note 7 of the Hales case which pointedly observes:
Admittedly, under the present statutory scheme in which the extension of benefits
beyond the six-year period is no longer discretionary with the Commission so long
as death benefit recipients remain dependent, section [35-1-]70 would rarely, if ever,
6

be applied It appears the section escaped repeal, as no longer necessary, by virtue
of separate section status As a glance at the annotation notes will show, the
legislature has repeatedly tinkered with section [35-l-]68, unmindful that, from 1973
on, those changes lendeied section [35-1 -]70. to which no particular legislative
attention seems to have been paid for over seven decades, quite unnecessary
Hales v Industnal Commission of Utah, 854 P 2d at 542 fn 7 [emphasis added] It is obvious that
Utah Code Ann §35-1-70 is a vestigial artifact that from 1973 on has "escaped repeal" even though
it is wholly unnecessary Id_ See also Order of Administrative Law Judge dated December 18,
1997, Stouffer's Exhibit "2" p 106 (Judge Ehceno observes that "[t]he legislature did not mean for
this section to specify liability foi ERF following the initial 312 weeks of death benefits, aftei the
legislature cieated employer/camei liability for these continuing benefits in 1979

To read it

otheiwise would mean that the legislatuie intended to have two mutually exclusive piovisions to be
in existence, one specifying employei/carner liability for the continuing benefits and the other
specifying ERF liability foi the same benefits ")
Stouffer again attempts to salvage its position by interpreting the Hales case as somehow
supporting the proposition that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund is liable for continuing death
benefits under post 1979 Utah Code Ann §35-1-68 (Stouffei's Brief pp 17-18) Stouffei quotes
foot note 5 of Hales in its entirety but, disiegaids the preface to the foot note wheiem the Court
states "We express no definite opinion on the issue likely to resurface on lemand, namel}, whether
petitioneis' claim should have been asserted against the fund

" Hales v Industrial Commission

of Utah. 854 P 2d at 542 fn 5 The Court in Hales unambiguously disclaims issuing an opinion on
the liability of the Employers' Remsuiance Fund under Utah Code Ann §35-1-68 Stouffer cannot
side step the Court's own disclaimer in Hales

7

CONCLUSION
The plainly stated intent of the Utah Legislature in passing Senate Bill 111, the 1979
amendment to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68, was to rescue an insolvent fund by shifting liability for
continuing death benefits under the act from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the employer and
or the employer's insurance carrier. It makes little sense that the legislature, having announced its
purpose for propounding Senate Bill 111, to proceed and pass an amendment that in effect left the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund liable for ongoing death benefits under the statute while on the road
to bankruptcy. After the 1979 amendment, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68, can only reasonably be read
to shift liability for newly incurred death benefits from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the
employer and or the employer's insurance carrier. The Court of Appeals should dismiss Stouffer's
appeal and affirm the Order of the Appeals Board of the Utah labor Commission.
Submitted this 1 C \

day of July, 1998.

I

^/Mcmvd
M. LaJeuh^se
/Associate General Counsel
\UtamMbor Commission
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Legislative Excerpt
February 16 1979
Senate Bill 111
Senator; Cornaby andteuc-i•.-..
President:

....Second reading calendar, Senate Bill

Clerk:

Senate Bill number 111, Workman's Compensation by Senator Cornaby. '1 he
report reads Mr. President the [inaudible] Committee on Business, Labor and
Economic Development which was referred Senate Bill 111, Workman's
Compensation by Senator Cornaby, has carefully considered the bill and reports
the same out favorably. Respectfully Senator Arnold Christensen, Committee
Chairman.
•l'!/!iaf>H

Asay:

I move that we adopt the committee report

President:

You've heard die motion thai w^ <\L:- a.-: ,<• n;n; uv report.
favor of the motion say aye.

Group:

Aye

Preside!;:

rhose opposed, no. The motion carries. 'in<:ro:na nee rciioi
bill is before us. Senator Cornaby.

Cornaby:

Senate Bill 111 comes to us from the State Industrial Commission and is entitled.
Workman's Compensation. The purpose of the bill is to correct an inequity which
has arisen in the so called second injury fund. Now this is the fund that pays
benefits to spouses and dependents of covered workers who were killed in
employment. At the present time the fund has become actuarially unsound and is
getting further into an unsound position. The purpose of this bill is to correct that
situation by transferring the, by shifting the burden from the second injury fund.
The Industrial Commission has worked on this bill for the past year and have
finally worked out this solution to the problem. The bill is essential from this
standpoint that if this is not done we will find our second injury fund in a
bankruptcy situation. I think Senator Bunnell had a comment.

President:

Senmor Bunion, is n a i^ion comment?

]

'iscussioi i All in

JUOi

Well, I can make it as short as you like. 1 thmk this is a good bill, if y<m want to
pass it. There's some history behind this bill. 1 v''o \\ tei! you aa! of il, but some
years back, Senator Wadingham is gone, he was iuvuiveu -n daz, di^ suoo.id
injury fund, as I remember it, Steve Hadley over there can get me out of troub: i
I don't explain it right, if a husband is killed then the, the spouse I beg yoiir

pardon, is killed, then the state insurance fund, the surviving, I'll say widow, in
this case, is paid compensation according to how much the husband made for six
years. And that the cost of that is born by the employer. Now we cannot deny
now, what we call the second injury fund in which we funded mostly through
taxes on insurance policies and perhaps some other things that after the six year
period if the wife is still dependent and if the children haven't reached maturity
then the second injury fund took over and paid it from then on, there are also
some other disabled people paid out of this but for the purposes of this bill, as I
understand it we're only talking about surviving spouses. Back, when was this
Steve, '65, 73 that's right we amended this bill and increased the benefits and at
that time Lynn Richards who was the, kind of the godfather of the state insurance
fund advised us that when they went on the second injury fund we should reduce
their payments by the amount of their social security. Well we were kind of
bleeding heart fellows and we wanted to take care of the widows so we refused to
accept Lynn's recommendation and said that she was entitled to both the
compensation and a full social security. Lynn pointed out that this might be more
than she would have been entitled to if the husband was alive and he begged us
not to do that and he said someday you'd break the fund and that's exactly what's
happened. We've paid this out now for these six years and now the funds depleted
to the point we have to do something about it. As I understand this bill, first it
takes the spouse, the beneficiary out of the second injury fund and requires that
the employer or the insurance company who had the original insurance will have
to continue to pay those benefits and also the amount she receives from social
security will be reduced from the payment so that she will get what she's entitled
to but no more. That's roughly the purpose of this, and if we don't do that there
isn't going to be any money in the second injury fund to pay anyone so I would
urge the support of this bill.
President:

Further discussion on senate bill 111

?????:

Call for the question, Mr. President

President:

The question has been called for on the second reading of senate bill 111. The
questions is shall it be read a third time. Roll call vote.

CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that this is a true transcript of the tape recording of the proceedings of the
L.'LLiii Legislature regarding the second reading of Senate Bill 111 on February 16, 1979.

Sara Jensor
Legal Support Specialist
Utah Labor Commission
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Ch. 138
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[776]

The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, however, and
where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of
bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in
sections 35-1-65, 351-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess
of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week
for 312 weeks.
Section 3. Section amended.
Section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57,
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as
amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 71,
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as
amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65,
Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as
amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, as amended by Chapter 67,
Laws of Utah 1973, as amended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1975, as
amended by Chapters 151 and 156, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read:
35-1-68. Second injury fund created—Purpose—Funding—Injury causing death—Filing claim within one year—Payment into fund when
no dependents—Payment to dependents—Presumptions of dependency—Payment to partially dependent persons—Effect of remarriage.
(1) There is created a second injury fund for the purpose of making payj
ments in accordance with the provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of this title^
This fund shall succeed to all monies heretofore held in that fund designated
as the "special fund" or the "combined injury fund" and whenever reference
is made elsewhere in this code to the "special fund" or the "combined injury
fund" that reference shall be deemed to be to the second injury fund. The
state treasurer shall be the custodian of the second injury fund and the comj
mission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable administration assistancg
may be paid from the proceeds of that fund. The attorney general shall
appoint a member of his staff to represent the second injury fund in all proj
ceedings brought to enforce claims against it.
(2) In case injury causes death within the period of six years from the
date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial
expenses of the deceased as provided in secTion 35-L81, and further benefits
in the amounts and to the persons as follows:
[(1) If thoro arc no dependents, the employer and insurance carrier shall
pay into the state treasury the sum of $15,600. Any claim for compensation
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of dcath-of
the deceased, and, if at the end of one year from the date of death of the

[7771
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Cfa. 138

&u-ry by the employer or the insin\HHre-^h*p*He3~41khr^
shall be
reduced by the amount of any weekly CGH-B-pe&Srition payments paid to or due
Ute-4erease<i-be*-vroen the date of tlv^-^-eielent and his death. Such pay^m-oftt
shall be held in a special fu-nd for the purposes provided in this t&ler-fcke
state treasurer shall bo the custodian of such special fund, and the commission shall direct the distribution thereof.—If the commission has reasonably
defcepmifted-that there-are no dopeR-den-t-s--of the deceased, it may order the
employer or insurance carrier to pay into t-ke-s-tate treasu-py-th-e sum speeiMed in fekis-sabseetion to be hold in that special fund for a pcrk>d~^4H^e-yearfrom the death of the deceased.—Any claim filed within that year fo?-w-h4eh
an aw-apd is m-ade by the commission shall be paid out of tke-s^am-d^esifced
by the employer or insurance earner—-before any further claim may be
fts&ef4e4-rV^a4fi&^4 be^^ioloyer^iMm^^flefeM? a Fr4er-rl
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from the date of
death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for the employer or
insurance carrier to pay into the second injury fund the sum of $18,720. The
$18,720 shall be reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or due the deceased between the date of the accident and
death. Should a dependency claim be filed subsequent to the issuance of
such an order and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is made by the
commission, the award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit
to the second injury fund by the employer or insurance carrier before any
further claim may be asserted against the employer or insurance carrier. In
the event no dependency claim is filed within one year from the date of
death, the commission's temporary order shall become permanent and final.
If no temporary order has been issued and no claim for dependency has
been filed within one year from the date of death, the commission may issue
a permanent order at any time requiring the carrier or employer to pay
$18,720 into the second injury fund. Any claim for compensation by a
dependent must be filed with the commission within one year from the date
of death of the deceased.
(b) (j) It there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death,
the payment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 66 2 / 3 % of the
decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not more
than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5
for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age
of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children
not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the
injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury per week, to continue during dependency for the remainder of
the period between the date of the death and not to exceed six years or 312
weeks after the date of the injury.
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during dependency following the expiration of the first six-year period described in subsection (2)(b)(i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those
wholly dependent persons during that initial six-year period, reduced by
50% of any weekly federal social security death benefits paid to those
wholly dependent persons.

Ch. 138

LABOR IN GENERAL

[778]

(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the commission at the end of the initial six-year period and annually thereafter. If in
any such review it is determined that, under the facts and circumstances
existing at that time, the applicant is no longer a wholly dependent person,
the applicant may be considered a partly dependent or non-dependent
person and shall be paid such benefits as the commission may determine
pursuant to subsection (2)(c)(ii).
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse
of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a six-year period from the date of death of the employee. This presumption shall not apply after the initial six-year period and, in determining
the then existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the commission
shall exclude 50% of any federal social security death benefits received by
that surviving spouse.
[(&}] {c) ji) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death,
the payment shall be 66 2 / 3 % of the decedent's average weekly wages at
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a
minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for the remainder
of the period between the date of death and not to exceed six years or 312
weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each case may determine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of [$15,600] $18,720.
The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of injury, and
any amount awarded by the commission under this subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this title.
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent pursuant to
subsection (2)(b)(iii) shall be determined by the commission in keeping with
the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the time of the
dependency review and may be paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the
maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person would receive if wholly
dependent.
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during
their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier.
[(4)] jd_) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent
persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits as
it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded to all
parties concerned shall not exceed the maximum provided for by law. [Following the period during which the employer or its insurance carrier is
required to pay benefits under this act, there shall be paid to such persons,
d-uring the period of their dependency, out of the special fund provided for
in subsection (1), the same benefits as paid by the employer or its insurance
earner, as provided in subsection (2) and (3). The issue of dependency shall
be reviewed at the time application is made for additional benefits from the
special fund.]
[(&)—The commission shall order that there bo paid to such dependents,
as provided in subsections (2) and (3), benefits at the rate of 66 2/3% of the
deceased's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more
than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
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ih&-+n-jwy^ier—w^4f~^4-4^
minimum of $45 per weekr-*Ht£-oi
^hrV^-s-peeial fund provided for in subsection (1) and for that period of time
kegfoning with the time that the payments to be made by the employer or
to insurance carrier terminate and ending upo-n—t-he termination of said
dependency.]
[(4)] (e) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of
death and the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or its insurance carrier to said dependents, prior to the termination of dependency,
including any remarriage settlement, does not exceed [$15,6001 $18,720, the
employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between the
amount paid and the sum of [$15,600] $18,720 into the [special] second injury
fund provided for in subsection (1)
Section 4. Section amended.
Section 35-1-71, Utah Code Annotated 19o3, as amended by Chapter 151,
Laws of Utah 1971, is amended to read:
11!)-J -i 1. Dependents— Pre sumptions— Detemiinatioiiij.
The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly d* \n nduil b»i
poi t upon a deceased employee:

up

[U-)—A husband or wife u-peft-a-speuso with whom that individual lives at
£be-t iroe- ef-th-e-deat-hr]
[(2)] (I) Children under the age of eighteen years or over such age, if
physically or mentally incapacitated[T] and dependent upon the parent, with
whom they are living at the time of the death of such parent, or who is
legally bound for their support.
(2) For purposes of payments to be made under'S'ubsection (2)(b)(i) of section 35-1-68, a surviving husband or wife shall be presumed to be wholly
dependent upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the time of the
employee's death.
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall
be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing
at the time of the injury [resulting in the] or death of such employee, except
for purposes of dependency reviews pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(iii) of section 35-1-68. [but no] No person shall be considered as a dependent unless he
or she is a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears [to him]
the relation of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or
sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall include a posthumous
child, and a child legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and half
sisters shall be included in the words "brother or sister" as above used.
Section 5. Section amended.
Section 35-1-74, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57,
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as
amended by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49,
Laws of Utah 1963, as amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as
amended by Chapters 151 and 156, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read:
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dance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35. This fund
shall succeed to all monies previously held in the
&Special Fund," the ^Combined Injury Fund," or
the &Second Injury Fund." Whenever this code refers to the &Special Fund," the &Combined Injury
Fund," or the &Second Injury Fund" t h a t reference
is considered to be the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund. The state treasurer shall be the custodian of
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds
of the fund. [The-attorney-general-shall-appoint a
member ofh is^tafTtorepresent-the-Employer^Remsuranee-Fund-in-aHproeeedi ngs-brought-to-enforee claims-agfiins^itl The commission may employ
or retain counsel to represent the Employers' Reinsurance Fund in proceedings brought to enforce
claims against or on behalf of t h e fund. Upon request of the commission, the attorney general shall
aid in representation of the fund.

CHAPTER 110
H . B . N o . 196
Passed February 2 1 , 1990
Approved March 8, 1990
Effective April 23, 1990
LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION A N D EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE F U N D
By David S. Ostler
AN ACT RELATING TO LABOR; AUTHORIZING THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO
RETAIN COUNSEL TO R E P R E S E N T THE
COMMISSION AND THE EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE F U N D ; CLARIFYING THE DUTIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL A N D
COUNTY A N D CITY ATTORNEYS; A N D
MAKING TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:

(2) If injury causes death within a period of six
years from the date of the accident, the employer or
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of
the deceased as provided in Section 3 5 - 1 - 8 1 , and
further benefits in the amounts and to the persons
as follows:

AMENDS:
35-1-32, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 75,
LAWS OF UTAH 1971
35-1-68, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 116,
LAWS OF UTAH 1988
Be it enacted by the Legislature

(a) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the
time of the death, the payment by the employer or
its insurance carrier shall be 66-2/3% of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week
and not less than a minimum of $45 per week, plus
$5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children,
but not exceeding the average weekly wage of the
employee at the time of the injury, and not exceeding
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week. Compensation shall continue
during dependency for the remainder of the period
between the date of the death and the expiration of
six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury.

of the state of Utah:

S e c t i o n 1. S e c t i o n A m e n d e d .
Section 3 5 - 1 - 3 2 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1971, is
amended to read:
35-1-32. A t t o r n e y r e t a i n e d b y c o m m i s s i o n —
D u t i e s of a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l a n d c o u n t y a n d
city a t t o r n e y s .
The commission may [with-the-approval-ofHhe
govei^m)r-appe4n^a-representative-to-aet-as-speeial
pros^euter-or-to-defernHn-any-suitr aetionT-proeeedingriftvestigatie^Tl^aFing-e^-trial-relating^to-mattere^thiivor-^neei^ing-it^jui4sdktiott] employ or
retain counsel to represent the commission in proceedings to enforce actions of the commission or to
defend the commission from actions brought
against it. Upon the request of the commission, the
attorney general [OF], the county attorney, or city attorney of the [eeunty] locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial [had-under-the provisions of
this-titlel is pending, in which the employee resides,
or in which the employer resides or is doing business, shall aid [thereinandproseeute,-under-thesuper^4sionof^eeommi9siony«ll-neeessary-aetH)n90F
proeeedmgs-for-the-enforeemenrt-of this-titlel in the
representation of the commission.

(ii) The [weeklyl payment to wholly dependent
persons during dependency following the expiration
of the first six-year period described in Subsection
(2) (a) (i) shall be an a m o u n t equal to the weekly
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons
during that initial six-year period, reduced by 50%
of any weekly federal Social Security death benefits
paid to those wholly dependent persons.
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the commission a t the end of the initial sixyear period and annually thereafter. If in any such
review it is determined that, under the facts and circumstances existing at t h a t time, the applicant is no
longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant
may be considered a partly dependent or nondependent person and shall be paid such benefits as
the r v • nission may determine under Subsection
(2)(b)(ii).

S e c t i o n 2. S e c t i o n A m e n d e d .
Section 3 5 - 1 - 6 8 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 1988, is
amended to read:
35-l~i>3. E m p l o y e r s ' R e i n s u r a n c e F u n d —
Injury c a u s i n g d e a t h — Burial e x p e n s e s —
P a y m e n t s to d e p e n d e n t s .

(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a deceased employee
shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a six-year period from the date of death of

(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance
Fund for the purpose of making payments in accor-
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the employee. This presumption shall not apply after the initial six-year period and, in determining
the then existing annual income of the surviving
spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any
federal Social Security death benefits received by
that surviving spouse.
(b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the
time of the death, the payment shall be 66-2/3% of
the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of
the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45
per week. Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between
the date of death and the expiration of six years or
312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission
in each case may determine. Compensation may not
amount to more than a maximum of $30,000. The
benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of
dependency existing at the date of injury, and any
amount awarded by the commission under this subsection shall be consistent with the general provisions of this title.
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent under Subsection (2) (a) (iii) shall be determined by the commission in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing
at the time of the dependency review and may be
paid in [a weekly] an amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent [person]
persons would receive if wholly dependent.
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to
such persons during their dependency by the employer or its insurance carrier.
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also
partly dependent persons at the time of death, the
commission may apportion the benefits as it considers just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded to all parties concerned do not exceed
the maximum provided for by law.
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(Utah 1982); Clark v. American
"' * 3>
Iridard, Inc., 583 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah
jjf8)/-A third party who benefits only Marilyn R. HALES, Widow; Delbert R.
Hales, Monica M. Hales, and Cristal E.
dentally from the performance of a conHales,
Minor Dependent Children; and
* has no right to recover under that
Robyn L. Chambers, Former Wife of
gtr^ct. Mel Trimble Real Estate v Fitz
David K. Hales, deceased, Petitioners,
^,626 R2d 453, 454 (Utah 1981)- Rio
v.
om Corp., 618 P.2d at 506; Tracy Col>§52 P.2d at 1315; Schwinghammer The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH; Emery Mining Corporation,
|tah 2d at 420, 446 P.2d at 415
aka Utah Power & Light Company;
fothing in the bond indicates that
and Energy Mutual Insurance Co., Refter or Northwestern intended to conspondents.
k in plaintiff the right to enforce payNo. 920319-CA.
& ; T i ? . b 0 n d 0 n I y l i s t s A t I a * and Check
^obligees. Plaintiff argues that beCourt of Appeals of Utah.
te the purpose of the bond is to safeApril 23, 1993.
>d against the presentation of the lost
iicate she is an intended beneficiary
h Wever
ffi
°
' overlooks the fact that
Petitioners sought review of Industrial
Wild is intended to safeguard and inCommission's
order denying their motion
bify Atlas and Check Rite against a
for
review
of
administrative law judge's
gre claim on the lost certificate It is
denial
of
dependent
death benefits. The
^intended to protect plaintiff from purCourt
of
Appeals,
Orme,
J., held that workging a stock certificate that has been
)rted lost or stolen. Performance on ers' compensation statute of repose which
%bond only incidentally benefits plaintiff provided death benefits to dependents only
i-providmg a fund from which her dam- when work-related injury caused death
within six years of accident was unconstitues,may ultimately be paid.
tional under open courts provision.
U
Since plaintiff is not a third-party benefiReversed and remanded.
!V%n the bond, we affirm the trial
L,
s dismissal of Count IV.
1. Administrative
Law and Procedure
en
V r f Plaintiff
<3=*663
Workers' Compensation <£=>1828
tost Atlas and Check Rite for converAdministrative law judge's decision
g e d wrongful refusal to transfer stock
that
workers' compensation claims were
ftfrmei
The trial court's denial of
barred, and Industrial Commission's review
thereof, constituted formal adjudicative
K a n d ^ mdaimS
^ ofis plaintiffs
third
al
proceedings which were properly reviewed
Court of Appeals. U.C.A.1953, 63-46bP 2 r d ° f att0rney *» to Pontiff is 4,by 63-46b-16.
W181B

Kr ^^? ° °

SS^ft

^d

- firmed

tftu

g ^ L , C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
$HAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

C ° | KmiUMBER SYSTEM^

2. Appeal and Error <s>893(l)
Whether statute is constitutional presents question of law which Court of Appeals considers de novo.
3... Workers' Compensation <s=*39
Workers' compensation statute of repose which provided death benefits for dependents of injured employee only when
work-related injury caused death within six
years of accident was unconstitutional un-
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der open courts provision, as there was no
effective and reasonable alternative remedy for dependents; provision allowing discretionary recovery against special fund
applied only to dependents who had been
receiving benefits in their own right and
discretionary extension of benefits was not
remedy constitutionally equivalent to right
to receive benefits. Const. Art. 1, § 11;
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68(2), 35-1-70.
Virginius Dabney (argued), Salt Lake
City, Dabney & Dabney, P.C., for petitioner.
Rinehart L. Peshell (argued), Fairbourn
& Peshell, Midvale, for respondents, Emery
Min. & Energy Mut.
Benjamin A. Sims, General Counsel, Industrial Commission of Utah, Salt Lake
City, for Industrial Com'n of Utah.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME,
JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Petitioners appeal the Industrial Commission's order denying their motion for review of an administrative law judge's decision holding they were not entitled to dependent death benefits. The basis of petitioners' appeal is that the statute under
which their claims were denied, Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-68(2) (1979), is an unconstitutional statute of repose. We agree and
accordingly reverse the Commission's order.1
FACTS
David K. Hales sustained a compensable
injury on May 24, 1982, while employed by
Emery Mining Corporation. He was initially paid temporary, total disability compensation and was awarded 32% permanent,
partial disability compensation for orthopedic and internal medical problems, anxiety,
1. Because we find the section an unconstitutional statute of repose, we need not address petitioners' second argument that the provision violates their equal protection rights under the
Utah Constitution. See Velarde v. Industrial

depression, and intractable pain. Eventual*?
ly, he was awarded permanent, total disi jj
ability compensation. Mr. Hales died orrS
November 25, 1988, more than six years
after the accident.
f ^
Petitioners allege that the cause of Mr?i
Hales's death was his industrial accideri'
and, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 35&J
l-68(2)(a) (1979), they filed dependents*
death claims within one year of the date o$J
his death. Emery Mining Corporation, Mr.!
Hales's employer, and its workers' compendia
sation insurance carrier, Energy Mutual lihM
surance Company, denied responsibility fori
death benefits based on the time limitationm
found in Utah Code Ann. § 35^1-68(|j
(1979), which provides, in part:
", i
In case injury causes death within th$M
period of six years from the date of thej
accident, the employer or insurance carri-^ij
er shall pay the burial expenses of, theyi
deceased as provided in section 35-l-8i,^
and further benefits [provided in subse^
quent subsections of section 68, including)
payments to the deceased's dependents]^
[1] On April 3, 1992, the administrative \
law judge held that petitioners' claims were' I
indeed barred by this statute because Mr.^S
Hales died more than six years after the J
accident that allegedly caused his death. 1
On April 17, 1992, petitioners filed a motion «
for review with the Commission alleging M
that the statutory provision in section 35- 9
1-68(2) violated the Utah Constitutional
open courts provision by extinguishing^;!
their constitutional right to litigate a validlS
claim before their right to file that claiflfejj
arose. See Utah Const, art. I, § 11. Orijf
May 6, 1992, the Commission affirmed thel|
administrative law judge's decision. In s$*<
doing, the Commission noted the likelihoo&J
that it would be reversed by this court on
the authority of Wrolstad v. Industrial^
Commission, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App-k
cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990),'
and Velarde v. Industrial Commission,
831 P.2d 123 (Utah App.1992), but exComm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 130 (Utah App.1992);
Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 P.2d 243,3
244 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d H38j
(Utah 1990).
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pressed the view it had no power to rule on
the statute's constitutionality.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[2] The Utah Administrative Procedures Act permits us to grant relief if the
.'petitioners have been' substantially prejudiced because "the agency action, or the
'statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or
lis applied." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b!-i"6(4)(a) (1989). Whether the statute is constitutional presents a question of law which
,we consider de novo. See Velarde, 831
J>.2d at 125.

ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
The difference between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose is that
[a] statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period
of time after a legal right has been violated or the remedy for the wrong committed is deemed waived. A statute of
repose bars all actions after a specified
period of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a
cause of action.

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d
670, 672 (Utah 1985). "A statute of repose
{t
[3] Petitioners assert that Utah Code . . . prevents suit a statutorily specified
*Ann. § 35-1-68(2) (1979), and the various number of years after a particular event
^versions thereof subsequently enacted in occurs, without regard to when the cause
F
the course of amendment and recodifica- of action accrues." Velarde v. Industrial
tion, is an unconstitutional statute of re- Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App.
*pose in violation of Article I, Section 11, of 1992). An action accrues, generally, "upon
tyhe Utah Constitution. Section 35-1-68(2) the happening of th% last event necessary
^provides that employers or their insurance to complete the cause of action." Becton
<;
carriers shall pay death benefits to depen- Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254,
dents only when the work-related injury 1257 (Utah 1983).
'''causes death within the period of six
In the instant case, petitioners' cause of
•years from the date of accident." Petition- action accrued upon the death of Mr.. Haers claim this statute leaves dependents les, yet the six-year period of section. 35-1'without a remedy if an injured worker sur- 68(2) had already run so as to bar the
vives more than six years from the date of assertion of their claim. Consequently,
hts^ industrial injury and then dies. Be- section 35-1-68(2) acts as a statute of recause the statute terminated the depen- pose. See Velarde, 831 P.2d at 126-27.
dents' cause of action before it arose, peti- (statute denying silicosis death benefits un•faoners argue, the statute acts as one of less death results within three years from
jtepose. Furthermore, petitioners argue last day employee worked held to be unconftgat no adequate, alternative remedy exists stitutional- statute of repose). Unless the
^and thus the statute of repose is unconsti- law provides an "effective and reasonable"
tutional. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft alternative remedy, the statute is unconsti||jrp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
tutional. Berry, 717 P.2d at 680.3
2*

ISSUE ON APPEAL

|§i$^Fhe Industrial Commission also expressed
||jgo.nfusion as to whether judicial review of its
Indecision would be initially in this court or by
l&trial de novo in the district court. The adminisgHrative law judge's decision and the Industrial
g'Commission's review constitute formal adjudic a t i v e proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 63p™>-4 (1989). Review is properly in this court.
SftJtah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 0989). See, e.%.,
m™iarde
v. Industrial Commn, 831 P.2d U 3
IWJtah App. 1992);
Wrolstad v.
Industrial
giCommH 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
Mr95 p - 2 d H38 (Utah 1990). No purpose would

be served by a trial de novo in the district court
where the relevant facts are not in dispute and
the issue is soJeJy one of law. C). Alumbaugh v.
White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App.1990) (per curiam) (disputed factual finding, made without
formal hearing, reviewed by trial de novo in
district court).
3.

If there is no substitute or alternative remedy
provided, the statute of repose may be justified
only if there is a "clear social or economic evil
to be eliminated" and the means selected to
remedy the evil are not "arbitrary or unreason-
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Respondents argue that section 35-1-68
does not violate the open courts provision
of the Utah Constitution "because Petitioners can still pursue their claims against the
Employers Reinsurance Fund," formerly
the second injury fund. Respondents claim
section 35-1-68(2) does not cut off the
claims of the deceased's dependents, but
merely limits the liability of the employer
or insurance carrier for death benefits to
the period of six years from the date of the
employee's injury. As to benefits payable
after the six years, dependents have an
alternative remedy by pursuing their
claims against the special fund, provided
for in section 35-1-68(1), under Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-70 (1988).
Section 70 provides, in its entirety, as
follows:
If any wholly dependent persons, who
have been receiving the benefits of this
title, at the termination of such benefits
are yet in a dependent condition, and
under all reasonable circumstances
should be entitled to additional benefits,
the industrial commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits;
but the liability of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall not be extended, and the additional benefits allowed
shall be paid out of the special fund
provided for in Subdivision (1) of Section
35-1-68.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-70 (1988) (emphasis
added).
Respondents argue that petitioners were
receiving benefits under "this title," and
thus have an alternative remedy pursuant
to section 35-1-70, because Mr. Hales was
receiving permanent, total disability benefits under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67
(1988). That section states that an "employee shall receive" compensation which
may not be more than 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the
injury . . . [and] may not be less than the
sum of $45 per week,, plus $5 for a
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18
able." Berry, 111 P.2d at 680. Respondents do
not argue that there is any social or economic
evil to be eliminated and, therefore, the issue is

years, up to a maximum of four such
dependent minor children
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988) (emphasis
added).
Based upon the above quoted statutes,
respondents argue that although the employee receives the check under section 67,
the dependents are included in the calculations determining benefits and the dependents, therefore, are receiving benefits, albeit through the injured employee. Consequently, respondents continue, petitioners
were receiving benefits pursuant to section
35-1-70 and may proceed against the special fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1).
Respondents conclude that even if section
68(2) extinguishes petitioners' death benefit
claims against the employer before they
arise, this alternative remedy available to
them through section 35-1-70 precludes
section 35-1-68(2) from being unconstitutional. Respondents bolster their argument by submitting that if section 35-1-70
did not apply in the instant case, it would
never apply.
Petitioners respond by arguing that just
because the minimum permanent disability
compensation an employee may receive
pursuant to section 35-1-67 includes, as
part of the calculation, $5 for a dependent
spouse plus $5 for each dependent minor
child, the dependents here were not necessarily "receiving the benefits" for purposes
of section 35-1-70. Furthermore, petitioners submit, without contravention, that Mr.
Hales's disability pay did not include the $5
per dependent allowance referred to in section 35-1-67 because he was collecting the
maximum weekly rate without the additional dependents' allowance being considered.
By analyzing both the scheme of the
relevant statutes and their history, we conclude that section 35-1-70 does not provide
the beneficiaries with an "effective and
reasonable alternative remedy." Berry,
111 P.2d at 680.
B. Statutory Scheme
The statutory scheme specifically distinguishes between employee payments and
confined to whether a reasonable alternative
remedy is available.
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payments to dependents. Section 35-1-66 no longer. 1917 Utah Laws ch. 100,
sets out the compensation that an "em- § 79(2). As originally adopted, the death
ployee ... may receive" for his or her benefits ended six years after the injury
permanent, partial disability. Utah Code regardless of whether the spouse or child
Ann. § 35-1-66 (1988) (emphasis added). might still be dependent and in need.4 ObSimilarly, section 35-1-67 outlines the dis- viously in an attempt to remedy this harsh
ability payments an "employee shall re- scheme, the 1917 death benefits statute
ceive." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988) was amended four years later to include
(emphasis added). Both sections provide the following language, which language is
that the minimum compensation a worker the statutory ancestor of the current secshall receive is to be a sum certain plus $5 tion 35-1-70:
if the worker has a dependent spouse, plus
If any wholly dependent persons, who
$5 for dependent children under 18, up to a
have been receiving the benefits of this
maximum of four such dependent children.
Act, and who, at the termination of such
The maximum compensation allowed by
benefits are yet in a dependent condition,
these sections, which is what Mr. Hales
and under all reasonable circumstances,
apparently received, makes no reference to
should be entitled to additional benefits,
dependents and is based on an entirely
the
industrial commission may, at its disdifferent formula. Just because the exiscretion,
extend indefinitely such benefits;
tence of a dependent spouse or dependent
but
the
liability
of the employer or insurchildren increases the minimum compenance
carrier
involved
shall not be extendsation a partially or totally disabled emed,
but
the
additional
benefits allowed
ployee receives, it does not follow that
shall be paid out of the special fund
those dependents are receiving benefits for
provided for in subdivision 1 of this secpurposes of section 35-1-70. There is no
tion.
requirement that the additional $5 be paid
1921
Utah Laws ch. 67, § 3140(7) (emphasis
over to or used for the benefit of the deadded).
pendents. By contrast, section 35-1-68
The initial placement of the language of
specifically provides for benefits that are
paid to dependents. See Utah Code Ann. section 35-1-70 within the death benefits
§ 35-1-68(2) (1988). Thus, section 35-1-70 statute demonstrates that the phrase "reapplies only to dependents who have been ceiving the benefits" referred to depenreceiving benefits in their own right.
dents receiving benefits—death benefits—
A historical review of sections 35-1-70 in their own right; the provision has no
and 35-1-68 confirms our conclusion that relevance to dependents of employees who
receipt of disability payments by an injured have been receiving disability benefits, but
employee with dependents does not consti- who have not themselves been receiving
tute receipt of benefits by dependents for benefits. And this holds true even if the
dependents have been taken into account in
purposes of section 35-1-70.
calculating the amount of disability benefits received by the employee.
C. Statutory History
In over seventy years since the words
The predecessor of the present dependent death benefits statute, Utah Code now found in section 35-1-70 were originalAnn. § 35-1-68 (1988), was first enacted by ly adopted, they have remained essentially
the Utah Legislature in 1917. 1917 Utah unchanged. The only significant change
Laws ch. 100, § 79. That original statute has been that the provision was taken out
provided death benefits to dependents, paid of the predecessor of the death benefits
by the employer or its insurer, for the section—section 68—and made its own selfperiod "between the date of the death, and standing section in 1933. Utah Rev.Stat.
six years after the date of the injury," but § 42-1-66 (1933). Although this provision
4. The failings of such a system are highlighted
in the scenario where a dependent child was
one year old at the time of the employee's injury

and the benefits ended automatically, with no
chance of extension, when the child was only
seven years old.
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for continuing death benefits in special 1979 as Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(b)(ii)
cases has remained a self-contained provi- (1979), pursuant to legislation that further
sion up to the present day codification in refined the calculation of benefits to be
section 35-1-70, its origin as a part of the paid "following the expiration of the first
death benefits section is significant.
six-year period." 1979 Utah Laws ch. 138,
6
Again, the 1921 amendment of the death § 3.
benefits statute remedied the situation in
This legislative history reveals that the
which the six-year limitation had run, but phrase "receiving the benefits" under secan employee's survivors were still depen- tion 35-1-70 was intended to refer to the
dent and in need. This amendment allowed beneficiary receiving benefits in his or her
the Industrial Commission to extend bene- own right—i.e., death benefits payable to
fits, at its discretion, for those dependent the dependent—not to the employee receivindividuals. So long as death benefits as ing other kinds of benefits calculated in
of right automatically ceased after the six part, and only where the maximum was not
year limitation, the escape valve provided reached, with reference to dependents.
in what is now section 35-1-70 was neces- Thus, section 35-1-70 simply does not apsary to remedy injustices. However, in ply to the instant case.7
1973 the death benefits statute was amended to automatically provide benefits "KM"
D. Inadequate Alternative
lowing the period during which the employer or its insurance carrier is required to
Finally, even if we were to assume that
pay benefits under this act . . . during the section 35-1-70 somehow applies in this
period of their dependency." 1973 Utah case, it does not save the statute of repose
Laws ch. 67, § 5 (codified as Utah Code because it does not provide an effective and
Ann. § 35-1-68(4) (1973)). Under this 1973 reasonable alternative remedy. The extenamendment, death benefits were to be paid, sion of benefits permitted under section
after six years from the date of injury, 35-1-70 is wholly discretionary. This disfrom the special fund provided for in sec- cretionary extension of benefits is not a
tion 35-1-68(1) until the termination of de- remedy that is constitutionally equivalent
pendency.5 This amendment obviated the to the right to receive death benefits that
need for dependents to seek the discretion- the statute of repose terminates before it
ary extension of death benefits under sec- has accrued.
tion 35-1-70 because the benefits were now
extended as of right, assuming only that
CONCLUSION
the individual remained in a dependent condition. The 1973 amendment, automaticalFor the foregoing reasons, the Commisly extending benefits, was recodified in sion's decision is reversed, as it predicted,
5. We express no definitive opinion on an issue
likely to surface on remand, namely, whether
petitioners' claim should have been asserted
against the fund rather than respondents and, if
so, whether their petition may now be amended
to join the fund. We note, however, that section
35-l-68(2)(b)(ii) appears only to contemplate a
continuation of death benefits by the fund in
situations where the employer's responsibility
has first been determined within the six-year
period and does not appear to hold open the
avenue of proceeding directly against the fund
in situations, like this one, where death occurs
outside the six-year period.
6. The former Utah Code Ann. § 35—1—
68(2)(b)(ii) (1979) is now codified as § 35-168(2)(a)(ii) (Supp.1992). We note that none of
the several amendments to this section have any

bearing on our analysis. Our analysis and conclusion apply to all of the permutations of section 35-1-68.
7. Admittedly, under the present statutory
scheme in which the extension of benefits beyond the six-year period is no longer discretionary with the Commission so long as death benefit recipients remain dependent, section 35-1-70
would rarely, if ever, be applied. It appears the
section escaped repeal, as no longer necessary,
by virtue of its separate section status. As a
glance at the annotation notes will show, the
Legislature has repeatedly tinkered with section
35-1-68, unmindful that, from 1973 on, those
changes rendered section 35-1-70, to which no
particular legislative attention seems to have
been paid for over seven decades, quite unnecessary.

